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REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: 
THE GROUND FOR A NEW APPROACH 
FERNANDO CANALE 
Andrews University 
Should theological scholarship be satisfied with already- 
existing theories about revelation and inspiration, or is there room 
for development of a new understanding of the way in which the 
Hebrew-Christian Scriptures were originated? In this article I probe 
the question of the ground or basis for developing a new approach 
to this doctrine. Further aspects of the topic will be considered in 
later articles. 
It seems clear, to begin with, that according to Scripture itself, 
both revelation (e.g., Dan 2:28; Gal 1:12; Eph 1:17; and Rev 1:l) and 
inspiration (eg., 2 Tim 3:16 and 2 Pet 1:21) are acts of God. 
Without attempting at this point to define these terms precisely, we 
can say that revelation involves God's action in the process of 
generating ideas in the mind of the prophet, whereas inspiration 
involves God's action in the process through which the prophets 
wrote down the revealed ideas and produced the Bible.' It follows 
that any interpretation of the revelation-inspiration process will be 
conditioned by the prior understanding of God and human beings 
that theologians consciously or unconsciously assume in discussing 
the origin of the Scriptures. 
When students of theology are able to realize that the natures 
of the two agents involved in the revelation-inspiration doct r ine  
God and the human spokesperson-are interpreted in diverse 
ways, they will have discovered why so many different and 
mutually exclusive interpretations of the very same process have 
been produced by theological reflection. 
'Herein I speak of revelation in its specific and technical sense that refers to the 
process by which Scriptures were originated. For a discussion of the broader range 
of meaning involved in the biblical concept of revelation and a summary of 
additional aspects involved in this biblical concept, see Wolfhart Pamenberg, 
Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
19911, 1~198-214. 
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The thesis in this article is that the ground on which a new 
basic Christian theology regarding revelation-inspiration can be 
developed is to be found at the level of the interpretation of the 
two agents that were necessarily involved in the production of the 
Scriptures. Briefly stated, a new theological model about the origin 
of Scripture is possible if the ground or basis for understanding 
God and the human spokesperson can be distinguished from 
previously existing models. The new model must, at the same time, 
be biblical in its interpretation of these two agents. 
1. God and Theology 
One's understanding of God affects directly one's conception 
of the manner and process of the divine action involved in 
revelation and inspiration? It is important to remember that God's 
being has been interpreted in various ways throughout the history 
of Christian thought. However, one basic commonality to most, if 
not all, of these is that God's being and activity are characterized 
less on the basis of biblical concepts than on concepts produced by 
human philosophy-more specifically, Greek philosophy? 
Because of its overarching systematic function, the doctrine of 
God is central not only to the revelation-inspiration doctrine but 
also to the entire system of Christian theology.' If a variation is 
*Paul Synave and Pime Benoit, commenting on Thomas Aquinas' interpretation 
of revelation (lumen prophetiae), correctly remark that Aquinas' solution is "based on 
a different conception of the concurrence of divine and human causality" (Prophecy 
and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-IIae, Questions 171-1 78, trans. 
Avery R. Dulles and Thomas L. Sheridan [New York: Desclee, 19611, 93). What 
Synave and Benoit do not say because of its obviousness is that Aquinas' conception 
of both divine and human causality is determined by his conception of God and the 
human being-in other words, by what may be identified as the components of the 
systematic structure of revela tion-inspira tion. 
%, e.g, Edwin Hatch, The Influence of GreekIdaas on Christianity, with foreword, 
new notes, and bibliography by Frederick C. Grant (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1957), 238-282. 
'The systematic centrality of the doctrine of God has been broadly recognized 
by both philosophers and theologians. Among the philosophers we find, for 
instance, Aristotle (Metaphysics, 6.1.10,ll) and Martin Heidegger ("The Onto- 
theological Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and Difference, ed. Joan 
Stambaugh [New York: Harper and Row, 1%9], 59,60). Among biblical theologians, 
see Gerhard Hasel (Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate [Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 19751, 100); and among systematic theologians, Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, who explains that ''in theology, the concept of God can never be simply 
one issue among the others. It is the central issue, around which everything else is 
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introduced concerning the interpretation of God's being and 
activity, the whole theological structure will be affected. This is 
exactly what has happened concerning the doctrine of revelation 
and inspiration. For one thing, both Roman Catholic and Protestant 
traditions have tended either to openly reject or covertly belittle the 
ideological content of the OT. In recent times, it appears that often 
even the NT is no longer considered normative. 
Instead of basing its theology squarely on Scripture, the 
Christian church in earlier ages began to adopt Greek philosophical 
concepts as useful tools for interpreting the meaning of God's 
being, his transcendence, and his actions in history. It may, in fact, 
be said that Greek philosophical ideas tended very much to 
displace OT thought from its proper role in Christian theology. 
In relationship to God's being and activity, one foundational 
difference between Greek philosophy and the Bible is that the 
former interprets ultimate reality to be timeless, whereas the Bible 
considers reality to be temporal and historical. During the medieval 
and modern periods of Christian history, in particular, the church 
has fostered a trend in Christian theology whereby a timeless 
interpretation of both the being and transcendence of God has been 
adopted. Indeed, we may well suggest that the timeless interpre- 
tation of God's being is very common in Christian theology, both 
in its classical and liberal traditions.' 
organized. If you take away that one issue nothing would be left to justify the 
continuation of that special effort that we call 'theology"' (An Introduction to 
Systematic Theology [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991],21). John Macquarrie states 
that in Christian theology the doctrine of God "has a central place" that "underlies 
all the other doctrines," and he further explains that this "doctrine of the triune God 
already contains in nuce the whole Christian faith, so that reflection upon it will 
provide us with a center to which we can relate all the other doctrines as we pass 
through them" (Principles of Christian Theology, 2d ed. [New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1977J, 187). In addition, see Anders Nygren, Meaning and Method: Prolegomena 
to a Scientific Philosophy of Religion and a Scientific Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1972), 357; and David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The N m  Pluralism in Theology 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988), 146-147. 
The difference between theology and religious experience should be drawn here. 
Many individual Christians, who faithfully submit to the clear meaning of Scripture, 
are unaware of systematic-theological positions about God and Scripture. I am 
convinced that there is a distinct dichotomy between what theology tends to set 
forth in this respect and the understanding and experience of Christian believers in 
general. However, it must also be remembered that theology directly determines the 
doctrines of churches and denominations, thus influencing the content of teaching 
and preaching. When specific beliefs are not drawn from the Bible but rather from 
tradition, even biblically oriented Christians are not always able to rid themselves 
of nonbiblical understandings of vital issues. 
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The idea of timelessness in philosophical/theological discus- 
sion is a technical one. For the purposes of this article, a concise 
explanation of it will suffice. Timelessness is the conception that 
reality in general and God in particular are essentially and 
necessarily voided of, and incompatible with, time and space.6 
Consequently, a timeless conception of reality necessarily 
eliminates from the realm of genuine reality anything that may be 
considered as historical, or analogical to what we call history. 
It is important to point out, further, that the technical sense 
in which timelessness is used in philosophy and theology must not 
be confused with common connotations usually connected with it. 
The technical sense of timelessness should not be identified with 
such ideas as, for instance, "having no beginning or end," "not 
restricted to a particular time or date," and "not affected by time: 
agele~s."~ In the technical philosophical view, the historical arena 
does not properly belong to reality. The timeless understanding of 
God means, consequently, that his reality is non-historical and 
incompatible with human history. Moreover, since God is 
considered to be the highest being, he is viewed as representing the 
highest level of timeless perfection. Therefore, God's actions cannot 
be conceived as his personal, historical involvement and operation 
within history, but rather as historical manifestations of his one 
eternal act outside of history.' 
6Augustine had a timeless understanding of the being of God. He did not 
develop it technically at length, but it clearly shows when the issue of God's being 
and works is addressed. For instance, Augustine affirms, "At no time, therefore, did 
you [God] do nothing, since you had made time itself. No times are coeternal with 
you, because you are permanent, whereas if they were permanent, they would not 
be times" (Confessions 1 1  1 4 ,  Thomas Aquinas describes the meaning of 
timelessness in the following way, as he uses it to portray the idea of God's eternity: 
'Those beings alone are measured by time that are moved. For time, as is made 
clear in Physics N, is 'the number of motion.' But God, as has been proved, is 
absolutely without motion, and is consequently not measured by time. There is, 
therefore, no before and after in Him: He does not have being after non-being, not 
non-being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being. For none of 
these characteristics can be understood without time. God, therefore, is without 
beginning and end, having His whole being at once. In this consists the nature of 
eternity" (Summa contra gentiles, trans., introd., and notes by Vernon J. Bourke 
[Garden City, I W  Doubleday, 19561, 1.15.3). 
' Webster's Ninth New Collegirte Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 
1991), S.V. "timeless." 
'For further information about the technical meaning of timelessness, see Nelson 
Pike, God and Timelessness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 6-16. 
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Thomas V. Morris explains the way in which a timeless God 
may be seen as "acting" in history: 
There is one eternal divine act outside of time that has a great 
number of different effects in time, at different times. One effect of this 
eternal divine act is the world's coming into being. Another is Abram's 
hearing certain words at a particular time. Still another effect of this 
same a d  is Moses' hearing of different words at a later time, and so 
forth. The single eternal act of God has a bewildering variety of effects 
with respect to his temporal creation. But from the evident truth that 
those effects take place at different times, it may not legitimately be 
inferred that they are effects of distinct actions which also take place at 
different times? 
When the conception of timelessness for God's activity is 
adopted, the historical aspect of the divine manifestation becomes 
reduced from its proper biblical sense of true reality (ontic- 
theological level) to the human cognitive awareness (epistemo- 
logical level) of "God for us." In other words, the historical acts of 
God portrayed in the Bible are interpreted, not as belonging 
essentially to God's being, but rather as belonging essentially to our 
human way of knowing-+ capacity of perceiving and knowing 
which is obviously historical and limited." 
A timeless God, moreover, cannot be thought of as achieving 
the work of atonement through a historical act involving contin- 
gency and real risk. Therefore, when the timeless nature of God is 
assumed, the divine atonement at the cross has to be reinterpreted. 
This is done, for instance, by suggesting that what occurred at the 
cross was purely the manifestation of our salvation's finding its 
ground in the eternal unchangeable being of God, notably in his 
eternal love. 
2. God in the Bible 
Biblical thinking about reality in general and about God in 
particular posits that reality is essentially temporal and historical." 
%omas V. Morris, Our idea of God: An introduction to Philosophical Theology 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1991), 131-132. 
1°By the term "historical acts" of God in history I mean divine acts in which God 
himself, experiencing the created temporal sequence (i.e., past, present, and future), 
but not limited to it, is a historical agent within the continuous flux of history. The 
definition of the so-called "historical acts" (or "act'? of God in the timeless model is, 
of course, diametrically opposed to this. 
"For an analysis of the way Exod 3 : l4 l6  reveals a historical understanding of 
the ultimate reality of God himself, see Fernando Canale, A Criticism of Magical 
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This historicity of biblical thought is self-evident and constitutes 
the presupposition for very important theological ideas concerning 
God's being and his eternity. 
In his Christ and Time, Oscar Cullmann uncovers the temporal 
conception of eternity that NT writers had. Cullmann underlines 
that "eternity, which is possible only as an attribute of God, is time, 
or, to put it better, what we call 'time' is nothing but a part, 
defined and delimited by God, of this same unending duration of 
God's time." He adds that "time and eternity share this time 
quality. Primitive Christianity knows nothing of a timeless God. 
The 'eternal' God is he who was in the beginning, is now, and will 
be in all the future, 'who is, who was, and who will be' (Rev. 
1:4)."12 This implies that real things, including God's being and 
activities, exist and occur in space and in time.'3 
One may regret that Cullmann has employed the historical 
conception of God's eternity as only a framework for his own 
interpretation of salvation history, without going more deeply into 
the implications that such a foundational idea has for the entire 
structure of systematic theology in general and for the doctrine of 
- --  
Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: 
Andrews University Press, 1987), 349-374. 
Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitiw Christian Conception of Time and 
History, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964),62-63. 
'3Contemporary philosophy has developed a temporal historical interpretation 
of Being (cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [New York: Harper and Row, 1%2], 
prologue; and see also id., 'The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," in 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology, ed. William Barrett and Henry D. 
Aiken [New York: Random House, 19621,3:213-214); yet, no acceptable interpreta- 
tion of God's temporality has been produced thus far. The dipolar solution of 
panentheistic "Process Philosophy" is not satisfactory because, relating God's time 
univocally to our human time, it actually identifies our world and time with a pole 
or component of God's being, thus destroying the possibility of personal relations 
with human creatures as presented in the Bible. Concerning this, see Alfred North 
Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmolqg (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 
521-524; and Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relatizn'ty: A Social Conception of God 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948), 88-92. Working from within a Hei- 
deggerian background, John Macquarrie also sees time in univocity to our human 
time and thus is unable to conceive Being or God as an entity existing in time and 
history (Principles of Christian Theology, 208). The same can be said of Pannenberg's 
position (see Metaphysics and the I d a  of God, trans. Philip Clayton [Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 19901, 7678; and Systematic Theology, 1: 401-410). Pannenberg is 
specrhcally critical of Heidegger and of Process Philosophy (Metaphysics and the Idea 
of God, &14,7475, and 113-129). The biblical conception of God involves a specific 
analogical understanding of time as a dimensionality of his very nature. 
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inspiration and revelation in particular.'* Indeed, the implications 
of following either of the two possible interpretations of eternity 
are momentous for the understanding of the being of God and for 
the understanding of the whole system of theology. The basic 
theological structure of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, in 
both conservative and liberal forms, has leaned toward the timeless 
view. In fact, it may be said that this theological structuring has 
been produced on the assumption of a timeless, non-historical 
interpretation of the being of God and of reality as a wh01e.'~ 
3. God and Revelation-Inspiration 
From what has been considered thus far, it is possible to 
understand why the doctrine of revelation and inspiration has been 
developed assuming this timeless, non-historical interpretation of 
"As far as I know, Cullmann never gave s p d c  analytical thought to the issue 
of revelation-inspiration. Rather, he limited his comments about time to the 
discipline of NT history, shying away from both dogmatic and philosophical 
reflection. In Christ and Time, he states: 'The message of the New Testament is most 
lucid within the framework of linear time, and until another is given which yields 
a greater understanding without adversely influencing the essentials of that 
message, I shall adhere to this framework. But it is no more than a framework." In 
the same place, he goes on to affirm that "the task of the dogmatic theologian is far 
more difficult than that of the New Testament scholar, in so far as the latter is 
required to show only what the New Testament teaches. He does not need to solve 
the difficulties arising in the teaching, nor wrestle with its basic presuppositions. 
But it is his bounden duty to keep within the limits of his work, for which the 
dogmatic theologian is thankful because only in this way can he rely on the results 
of the exegete's labor" (12). In Salvation in History Cullmann expands the vision that 
he briefly presented in Christ and Time, again without furnishing any systematic 
treatment of the doctrine of revelation-inspiration. He does, however, make some 
brief statements about revelation, suggesting basically that the Bible was originated 
by a combination of event and interpretation (Salvation in History [London: SCM, 
19671,8897). 
15Donald Bloesch correctly perceives that "we are living in an era of the 
confusion of tongues. We are confronted by the rise of theological schools that no 
longer share a common parameter, that are disturbingly incapable even of engaging 
in meaningful dialogue with one another because of the wide disparity in criteria 
and goals" ( A  Theology of Word and Spirit: Authority and Method in Theology [Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992],33). The affirmation of timelessness over the historicity 
of God's being and actions entails the concept that biblical language should be 
understood as indirect metaphoric or symbolic utterances in need of philosophical 
interpretation. If the timelessness of God is incorporated into theological 
methodology as a presupposition which determines the nature of God's actions, the 
sola Scriptura principle cannot be applied, even though it might be theoretically 
affirmed. 
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God's being, his transcendence, and his acts. The most influential 
present-day models of revelation-inspiration-such as the 
Thomistic thought-inspiration, the encounter-existential, and the 
various varieties of the dictation-verbal- be seen as stemming 
from some form of a timeless conception about God's being and 
activity? 
One way in which the doctrine of revelation-inspiration is 
affected when the timeless perspective is replaced with a historical 
one can be perceived, for instance, when the status of Scripture as 
a source of theological data is considered. When God is conceived 
to act within a timeless realm, the theological content of Scripture 
(which is brought into being by God) will also pertain to the 
timeless realm. In this case, the historical side of Scripture is 
considered to belong, not to its divine cause, but rather to the 
human condition necessary for the expression of its divinely 
(timelessly) originated content. Thus, the Scriptures are said to be 
"historically conditioned." On the contrary, the concept that God is 
capable of acting genuinely in history (that is, "historically") leads 
to a conception of the biblical writings as being "historically 
constituted." According to the former view, the historical side of 
Scripture is external and incidental to its religious and theological 
contents; according to the latter view, the historical side of 
Scripture belongs to the very essence of its divinely revealed and 
inspired contents. 
In conclusion, when substantial changes in the interpretation 
of God are introduced, substantial changes in the understanding of 
the revelation-inspiration process are also to be expected and do 
indeed occur. Since the Bible's conception of God's being and 
activity in history is clearly different from that of theological 
tradition in general, a critical reevaluation of the theological 
interpretation regarding Scripture origin is unavoidable. 
4 .  Human Nature and Theology 
The constitution of theological doctines not only presupposes 
an interpretation of God but also an interpretation of human 
nature. Basic anthropological concepts, therefore, appear as 
presuppositions which are involved, in various and different ways, 
'% is not the place to discuss these theories. It should be noted, however, that 
it is hardly possible or proper to speak of, let us say, the view popularly called 
"thought inspiration" without assuming at the same time a technical definition of 
"thought." 
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in the development of major Christian doctrines. For instance, 
Millard J. Erickson explicitly mentions the connection between 
anthropology and the doctrines of God, Christ, atonement, 
regeneration, justification, and eccle~iology.'~ He also explains that 
the conclusions reached in anthropological studies "will affect, if 
not determine, our conclusions in other areas of doctrine." He goes 
on to say: 
What man is understood to be will color our perception of what 
needed to be done for him, how it was done, and what his ultimate 
destiny is. If our conception of human nature is presupposed in our 
study of other doctrines, and if presuppositions have a significant 
influence upon conclusions, then the effort expended here is well worth 
it, for here the issues are overt and thus can be dealt with openly and 
Let us consider the way in which anthropology becomes a 
presupposition for the revelation-inspiration doctrine. As we have 
seen, besides God the other agent involved in the revelation- 
inspiration process is the human writer. The action of God is 
addressed to, and localized in, this writer. Both revelation and 
inspiration as acts of God occur within the human nature of the 
writer. As a human being, the writer can be said, therefore, to be 
the "place" or "locus" where the revelation-inspiration process 
occurs. This means that in this human being the ideas, data, 
information, etc., written in the Bible were originated as the result 
of God's revelational activities, and that likewise, in the human 
process of writing, the divinely originated contents were recorded 
through the process of inspiration. 
The importance of this human component cannot be over- 
emphasized, insofar as it determines, not the content, but both the 
cognitive mode of revelation and the linguistic mode of inspiration. 
Human knowledge and language can be considered not only in 
relation to their content but also in relation to their general 
characteristics, thus revealing their cognitive and linguistic 
"modes." 
"Millard J. Erickson, Christian Thaology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1983), 84,85, 
456-457. 
'%id., 457. Working within a quite different theological system, Pannenberg also 
recognizes the general function of anthropology as theological presupposition when 
he remarks that "the most general foundations of systematic theology will therefore 
have to come from anthropology" (Theology and the Ph~70mphy of Science, trans. 
Francis McDonagh [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19761,422). 
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The content dimension of human knowledge pertains to the 
various scientific enterprises undertaken by human beings. The 
"mode" dimension comes into view when either knowledge or lan- 
guage is considered in relation to its main characteristics aside 
from any reference to specific, concrete content. The interpretation 
of knowledge and language as "modes" uncovers the main general 
characteristics that were involved as God originated Scriptures 
through the agency of human beings. In other words, the theo- 
logical doctrine of inspiration and revelation presupposes a theory 
of knowledge and a philosophy of language. 
The technical task of interpreting the main characteristics that 
belong to human knowledge and language as modes of revelation 
and inspiration has been traditionally undertaken by the 
philosophical disciplines known as 'Theory of Knowledge" and 
''Philosophy of Language." It should not be forgotten that the task 
of uncovering the main characteristics of human knowledge and 
language is itself an interpretation that can only be built on the 
foundation provided by a specific interpretation of human nature. 
In other words, the theological doctrine of inspiration and 
revelation presupposes a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of 
language which themselves presuppose an interpretation of human 
nature. 
In short, since the doctrine of revelation and inspiration 
involves human knowledge and language as its cognitive and 
linguistic modes, it assumes a theory of knowledge and language.19 
This consequently assumes an anthropology that itself, in turn, 
assumes a philosophical ontology? The structural connection 
'Tor an introduction to the various ways in which the phenomenon of human 
knowledge has been interpreted, see Johannes Hessen, Erhntnisstheorie (Berlin: Ferd 
Diirnmlers, 1926); Thomas E. Hill, Contemporary Theories of Know2edge (New York: 
Ronald, 1961); John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (London: 
Hutchinson, 1986); and William Pepperell Montague, The Ways of Knowing: Or the 
Methods (4 Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925). For an introduction 
to the various ways in which the main characteristics of language have been studied 
by philosophical research, see J. M. E. Moravcsik, Understanding Language: A Study 
of Theories of Language in Linguistics and in Philosophy (The Hague: Mouton, 1975); 
Sidney Hook, ed., Language and Philosophy: A Symposium (New York: New York 
University Press, 1969); Franz von Kutschera, Philosophy of Language (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel, 1975); William P. Alston, Philosophy 4 Language (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1964); and Jack Kaminsky, Language and Ontology (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1969). 
Vor an introduction to the various ways in which the human being has been 
interpreted, see Michael Landmann, Philosophical Anthropology, trans. David J. Parent 
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between each of these stages is unavoidable. Human philosophy has 
produced a variety of interpretations regarding human nature that are 
invariably conditioned by the ontological views of the various schools 
of philosophy concerned. Variety in the presuppositions (ia., doctrine 
of God and doctrine of man) will necessarily produce a variety of 
results regarding the doctrine of revelation-inspiration. 
Is there a way to avoid the unertainty and plurality of theo- 
logical explanations without rejecting the structural connection of the 
stages involved? This is a question which requires a new answer 
regarding the philosophy-theology relationship. I will explore this 
matter in a future article; it suffices here to say that a new approach 
to the study of revelation and inspiration is essentially connected to 
the possibility of interpreting ontology, anthropology, knowledge, and 
language on the basis of biblical conceptualization. 
In conclusion, I would summarize by stating that a theological 
study of the revelation-inspiration process requires not only a clear 
conception of God, but also a correct view of the cognitive and 
linguistic capabilities of the human "prophet" (God's spokesperson in 
a broad sense, not limited to foretelling of the future). Thus, the 
technical understanding of the prophet's own nature and being 
(anthropological and ontological studies) and of the prophet's 
knowledge and language (epistemological studies) plays an important 
role in the theological formulation of any doctrine about the origin of 
the Scriphues. 
5. The Human Being in l%aoIogy 
Changes in our interpretation of the presuppositions will also 
determine and influence our interpretation of the revelation- 
inspiration process. As was the case concerning the concept of God's 
activity, the interpretation of the being of the human prophet and of 
that prophet's cognitive capabilities and linguistic characteristics has 
also been the object of various and different conclusions throughout 
the history of western philosophy? It is not surprising, therefore, that 
a great variety of theories about the origin of Scripture has been 
produced by Christian theology. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974); and Leslie Stevenson, Seven Theories of Human 
Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). 
%ee, e.g, Emil Bnuurer, Man in R d t :  A Christian Anthropologyf trans. Olive 
Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster, 19391, 40-53; Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and 
Destiny of A h :  A Christian Interpretation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 
1 :1-92; and Johannes Hessen, Erkenn tn issfheorie. 
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Traditional approaches, both in Roman Catholic and Protestant 
theological traditions, have, however, usually adopted a timeless 
interpretation of the being and knowledge of the human entity as an 
immortal soul or as "having" an immortal soul. Such a view is 
consistent with the timeless interpretation of the reality of God that 
these interpreters have also espou~ed.~ More recently, however, some 
liberal approaches have embraced a temporal understanding of the 
human being, and, consequently, also of the human being's cognitive 
and linguistic capabilities? 
6. The Biblical View of Human Nature 
In the early nineteenth century a theological revolution took 
place. Stemming from faithfulness to biblical concepts, it has worked 
consistently on the basis of an historical interpretation, not only of 
God but also of human reality. In some circles, the timeless-soul- 
substance idea of the human being that derives from a Platonic- 
Aristotelian heritage has been replaced by the biblical historical- 
relational understanding. This can be perceived, for instance, in the 
historicist approach to prophetic interpretation? 
Under the biblical model, this essence is seen as the actual 
historical concrete reality of the individual, who wholistically opens 
to the "other" and the world.* Consequently, the human cognitive 
mode that is involved in revelation-inspiration should also be 
understood in a historical way. 
%an's timelessness, however, is not considered to be absolutely perfect. 
Timelessness reaches its perfect expression only in God's being. In fact, in various 
ways different philosophical and theological approaches have merged human 
timelessness with undeniable human temporality without eliminating either the 
timelessness or the temporality. For an introduction to the understanding of the way 
in which a timeless interpretation of the nature of human beings as soul-substance 
determines the "modew of human cognition according to Thomas Aquinas, see 
Canale, 189-195, and also Macquarrie, 362-363. 
%ee Rudolf Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological (New York: 
MacMillan, 1955), 80, 83, 271; id., Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1958), 46,47,56; id., Faith and Understanding (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1964),56,187. 
%ee Richard Davidson, "In Confirmation of the Sanctuary Message," Journal of 
the A d m t i s t  Theological Society 2 (1991): lO(F101. 
25(>scar Cullmann, Immortality ofthe Sou2 or Resurraction 4the the? (New York: 
Macmillan, 1958), has demonstrated on exegetical grounds that the biblical teaching 
regarding the nature of man clearly contradicts the Greek philosophical conception 
about the immortality of the soul. 
REVELATION AND INSPIRATION 
7. Human Nature and Revelation-Inspiration 
A change in anthropological interpretation requires a change also 
in the interpretation of the main characteristics of human knowledge 
and language that are always assumed in a study of the doctrine of 
revelation-inspiration. The historical interpretation of man set forth in 
the Bible requires a historical interpretation of the cognitive and 
linguistic modes. Such an interpretation must replace the classical one 
wherein human cognition is based on the timeless understanding of 
the human soul as it was conceptualized under the Aristotelian agent, 
"intellect.'a In its classical, Aristotelian interpretation, the cognitive 
mode presents human reason as reaching general (universal) timeless 
concepts by elimination of the historical and material aspects of 
reality. The biblical view, on the contrary, understands the cognitive 
mode as obtaining knowledge historically by way of the conscious 
gathering and integration of all the data provided by concrete, 
historical events. 
As I will show in a future article, some contemporary 
approaches have rejected the classical doctrines of the immortality of 
the soul and of the Aristotelian agent, intellect. However, since these 
approaches do not base their new interpretations of either God or 
man on the biblical data, they tend to integrate many facets of the old 
views. Thus they fall short of perceiving the historical conceptuality 
assumed by biblical thinkers. 
Since the doctrine of revelation and inspiration assumes an 
interpretation of the nature of the knowledge that is produced and 
communicated in the Scriptures, a proper understanding of the 
cognitive and linguistic modes appears to be of paramount 
importance. It seems reasonable to assume that the biblical approach 
to the interpretation of the cognitive and linguistic modes, originating 
from the biblical conception of man, should be favored. 
In the historically and scripturally conceived interpretation of 
human nature and its cognitive and linguistic modes, two concepts 
that appear to carry special significance for a new appmach to the 
revelation-inspiration doctrine are freedom and limitedness. Indeed, 
human freedom appears to play an important role in the conception 
of the human cognitive and linguistic modes in which the Scriptures 
26A philosophical interpretation of human knowledge as historically constituted 
is, in fact, a very recent occurrence in the history of western epistemology. Some 
seminal thinkers in this area are, among others, Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein. 
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were produced. This freedom is not to be thought of as the mere 
capacity to choose among externally produced possi-bilities, but rather 
it is an expression of the very way in which human beings exist and 
are active in the world, creating their own possibilities and points of 
view. Thus, the human component in both revelation and inspiration 
may readily be understood as playing, not merely a passive role, but 
also an active one. 
The obvious temporal and spacial finitude of human beings 
translates into modes of knowing and language that, while being 
temporally constituted, are themselves limited and incomplete. The 
cognitive and linguistic modes in which both revelation and 
inspiration have been given refer to general characteristics of human 
thinking and writing that, when historically understood, include 
features such as limitation, multiplicity of perspectives, variety and 
heterogeneity of forms, and incompleteness. 
The distinction between modes and content should not be 
forgotten or ignored. Cognitive and linguistic modes should not be 
confused with the actual content of either knowledge or language as 
found in Scripture. Yet, the content, if it is to be communicated and 
understood by human beings, must adopt modes which cannot be 
separated from the biblical data themselves. 
8. Conclusion 
The ground that has been uncovered in this article as a basis for 
the doctrine of revelation-inspiration is really very simple. It consists 
of taking seriously the sda Scriphtra principle, seeking in Scripture the 
presuppositions that necessarily condition theological teachings. 
Among the various presuppositions that condition not only the 
formulation of the doctrine of revelation and inspiration but the 
whole of Christian teachings, we have specifically dealt with the two 
basic agents involved in revelation-inspiration: God, and the human 
being who serves as the transmitter of divine knowledge. When 
reinterpretation adopts the biblical perspective in place of the 
philosophical "timeless" model concerning these two agents, a basis 
or ground has been laid for a new and enriching theology of 
revela tion-inspiration. 
Once the basis or ground has thus been laid, the method-ological 
question still remains How should we formulate the doctrine of 
revelation-inspiration itself? The manner in which the issue of 
revelation-inspiration as a theological problem should be approached 
will be explored in my next article. 
